Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality
Volume 35

Issue 2

Article 13

May 2017

Casting a Wide Net: Why it is Incumbent Upon the Environmental
Protection Agency to Expand the Scope of its Cost- Benefit
Analysis to Include Native American Populations and Cultural
Fishing Practices in the Aftermath of Michigan v. EPA
Gretel Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawandinequality.org/
Recommended Citation
Gretel Lee, Casting a Wide Net: Why it is Incumbent Upon the Environmental Protection Agency to Expand
the Scope of its Cost- Benefit Analysis to Include Native American Populations and Cultural Fishing
Practices in the Aftermath of Michigan v. EPA, 35(2) LAW & INEQ. 393 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol35/iss2/13

Minnesota Journal of Law & Inequality is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.

393

Casting a Wide Net: Why it is Incumbent
Upon the Environmental Protection
Agency to Expand the Scope of its CostBenefit Analysis to Include Native
American Populations and Cultural
Fishing Practices in the Aftermath of
Michigan v. EPA
Gretel Lee†
“I think it is incredibly presumptuous and elitist for political
scientists to conclude that the American people’s cultural
values in fact are not ones that lend themselves to a cost-benefit
analysis and to presume that [the American people] would
change their cultural values if in fact they were aware of the
cost-benefit analysis.”1 — Joseph Biden

Introduction
On June 29, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States
struck down the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS)
provision under the Clean Air Act in a landmark 5-4 decision.2
The Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
acted unreasonably by implementing the MATS provision when it
determined that regulation of mercury emissions from electric
utility steam generating units (EGUs) was “appropriate and
necessary,”3 because the EPA did not take the cost of compliance
†. J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to
thank Professors Brad Karkkainen and June Carbone for their assistance, edits,
and suggestions as I wrote and re-wrote this piece. I also want to thank my family
for helping me solidify my thinking and for supporting me through this process. It
is an honor and a privilege to be able to share my thoughts and ideas on this very
important set of issues in this manner.
1. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
310 (1994) (statement of Hon. Joseph Biden, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary).
2. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711–12 (2015).
3. Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012). For the
purposes of clarity, please note that § 7412 is used interchangeably in court
documents and supplemental sources with its common citation, Clean Air Act
(CAA) § 112(n)(1)(A). “Appropriate and necessary” as interpreted by the EPA
serves as the rationale for regulation “after studying hazards to public health posed
by power-plant emissions.” Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2701. Furthermore, the “EPA
found power-plant regulation ‘appropriate’ because the plants’ emissions pose risks
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by the industry into account in the initial stages of regulation.4 In
adding to an already tumultuous history of regulating (and not
regulating) EGU emissions,5 the Supreme Court unanimously
moved in the direction of requiring cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for
major regulatory actions.6 This occurred despite differing opinions
on how CBA can and should be implemented, ultimately affecting
the outcome of the merits of the case. While CBA serving as a
justification for the implementation of a regulation is by no means
unheard of, the implications of this unanimous move are serious
and far-reaching, requiring each agency to conduct an in-depth
analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed action. The
Supreme Court has effectively held that the direct7 benefits of new
proposed regulations must outweigh the direct costs of complying
with the new regulation. The EPA, in this case, used the
monetized benefits of preventing the reduction of IQ points in
recreational anglers and their children who consumed their catch,
an amount totaling four to six million dollars annually in direct
benefits (despite the tens of billions of dollars in ancillary
benefits).8 The Court contrasted these benefits with the costs of
compliance, an amount totaling approximately $9.6 billion
annually.9 These figures stand in stark, obvious contrast to one
another. In order for new regulations to withstand this latest

to public health and the environment and because controls capable of reducing
these emissions were available. It found regulation ‘necessary’ because the
imposition of other Clean Air Act requirements did not eliminate those risks.” Id.
4. Id. at 2705 (noting that although § 112(d) requires the consideration of cost
for “beyond-the-floor standards,” the statute does not note the manner in which the
costs are to be considered).
5. The EPA’s various mercury regulations have been subject to much
litigation, and have been enacted, vacated, overruled, and reenacted. A history of
these regulations is discussed in Section I(A).
6. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712; see also id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(describing how the EPA considered costs in creating the MATS provision); Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (describing how agencies
must consider the costs and benefits of new regulations in addition to nonregulatory means of achieving regulatory goals).
7. Direct benefits are those that can be completely quantified and result from
the purpose of the rule; in Michigan v. EPA, it is the benefits from mercury
reduction. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2721. Direct benefits do not include ancillary
benefits, which are benefits derived from the manner in which the mercury is
monitored. Id. at 2711. In Michigan v. EPA, ancillary benefits included reductions
in other harmful emissions, like particulate matter. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at
2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2706 (“The Agency could not fully quantify the benefits of reducing
power plants’ emissions of hazardous air pollutants; to the extent it could, it
estimated that these benefits were worth $4 to $6 million per year.”).
9. Id.
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requirement, these figures need to stand on the opposite ends of
the CBA spectrum from where they presently reside.
On remand to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the EPA can improve its intentions in
regulating EGUs. This includes taking impacts on populations
other than recreational anglers into account, in particular taking
into account Native American peoples with the appropriated
rights to fisheries. These peoples attach cultural significance to
fishing and consuming fish, and yet their interests were left out of
the EPA’s analysis. Currently, the EPA is moving forward with
the claim that there is no mandatory formal CBA, which the
Supreme Court has also claimed.10 Thus, the MATS regulation
remains within the realm of requirements under the “appropriate
and necessary” regulation umbrella, despite the Supreme Court
overruling their regulation.11 Seeing as the Supreme Court is
unanimously moving in the direction of mandating that agencies
consider costs in a more formalized manner (though claiming it is
still up to the agencies to decide how to quantify them),12 agencies
need to expand the scope of the possible direct benefits of proposed
regulations. The weight given to Executive Order 12,866 also
brings attention to other pertinent Executive Orders, which need
to be given weight by agencies and courts alike, including
Executive Order 12,898 on environmental justice, ordered by
President Clinton.13
The Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA is part of a
growing insistence on CBA as necessary to justify regulatory
actions. These legal developments have worked to hamstring
regulatory efforts to protect less powerful groups, especially with
respect to environmental concerns. While a growing literature
addresses the limitation of CBA,14 the majority of literature
published on the subject does not address the specific impacts on
10. Id. at 2711.
11. Supplemental Finding That it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil- Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 75025 (proposed Dec. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 63).
12. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
13. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order
No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
14. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999); Xavier Dupuis, Applications and Limitations of CostBenefit Analysis as Applied to Cultural Development, UNESCO (1985),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000819/081977eo.pdf; Jonathan Masur &
Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016).
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Native American concerns. This is particularly true where the
loss is a threat to broad-based environmental interests (loss of
fish, for example, across a broad area rather than effects
concentrated on reservations), Native American cultural concerns,
as opposed to strict economic concerns, or where the impact affects
a relatively small number of Native Americans in comparison with
a larger group of non-Native Americans. All of these factors are
present in Michigan v. EPA.
The purpose of this Article is to encourage the EPA and, in a
larger sense, all federal agencies to reform the manner in which
they conduct CBA in order to give greater weight to benefits that
are inherently harder to quantify, and extend beyond the single
dimension of strict monetization. In particular, the EPA should
move in the direction of including more wide-scale benefits in
regulatory decision-making, as exemplified by inclusion of the
benefits faced by mercury reduction in Native American
populations, and in manners previously deemed “unquantifiable”
through the inclusion of Bayesian CBA.15 The Supreme Court has
claimed that ancillary benefits cannot be included in the primary
CBA.16 Thus, with the inclusion of the effects of hazardous air
pollutants (HAP) on a wider scale (specifically here, mercury and
its impacts on subsistence fishing populations), the benefits in the
reduction of mercury pollution forces the scale of costs versus
benefits towards a balanced proportion, bringing the agency closer
to being within the boundaries of compliance under the
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court.
Part I provides a brief background in the Michigan v. EPA
regulation battle, and an explanation as to why these regulations
are being challenged.
Part II discusses the effects of
methylmercury on the human body and the reasoning that went
into the decision to regulate mercury emissions. Part III consists
of an analysis of the impacts of environmental regulation on
Native American communities across the United States, their
constitutional and treaty rights to apportionment fishing and legal
protection, and how this has been and continues to be largely
ignored in the EPA’s analysis. This section will conclude with a
brief discussion on federalism constraints and related ongoing
15. This raises the issue of whether Native Americans can successfully argue
that the EPA had independent authority to address this issue without CBA at all.
This discussion, however, is outside the scope of this Article.
16. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (“Even if the Agency could have considered
ancillary benefits when deciding whether regulation is appropriate and
necessary—a point we need not address—it plainly did not do so here.”) (emphasis
in original).
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litigation. Part IV is comprised of a discussion on Bayesian CBA,
and how the EPA, and other agencies, moving forward, can
implement previous “unquantifiable” benefits into their own
analyses. This particular analysis will use the effects on Native
American communities as an area where the EPA could have
shown significant benefits in regulating harmful mercury
emissions.
I. Background—Michigan v. EPA and Regulations
a. Regulation of EGUs Under the Clean Air Act—It is
”Appropriate and Necessary” to Regulate Mercury
Emissions17
“The Administrator [of the EPA] shall regulate [EGUs] under
this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is
appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the
study required by this subparagraph.”18

EGUs are major stationary sources, and thus are regulated
differently than other sources under § 112 of the Clean Air Act
(CAA).19 Under the 1990 CAA Amendments, EGUs were singled
out for their large emissions and for the resulting impact on
surrounding communities and, as a result, had stricter regulations
imposed on them.20 They were required to implement new forms
17. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari for Petitioner, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46)
[hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (citing Regulatory Finding on the
Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam Generating
Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,830) (stating that the EPA found it appropriate to
regulate EGUs and noting that EGUs “are the largest domestic source of mercury
emissions, and mercury in the environment presents significant hazards to public
health and the environment.”). Note that the following section is a brief and
simplified summary of the legal proceedings as understood by the author. For a
more in-depth summary of the background leading up to the decision in Michigan
v. EPA, see the EPA’s Remand Legal Memorandum, summarizing the statutory
and legal history of EGU regulations.
18. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
19. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘major source’
means any stationary source or group of stationary sources located within a
contiguous area and under common control that emits or has the potential to emit
considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of any hazardous
air pollutants or 25 tons per year or more of any combination of hazardous air
pollutants.”).
20. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B) (2012) (“The Administrator shall
conduct, and transmit to the Congress not later than 4 years after November 15,
1990, a study of mercury emissions from electric utility steam generating units,
municipal waste combustion units, and other sources, including area sources. Such
study shall consider the rate and mass of such emissions, the health and
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of technology, including flue scrubbers under the Acid Rain
Provisions.21 The EPA published a list of these sources under §
112(c) of the CAA.22 The EPA first found regulation of coal- and
oil-fired EGUs “appropriate and necessary” in 2000 after
conducting two and evaluating three studies together under §
112(n)(1).
Section 112(n)(1)(A) required the EPA to conduct a study of
the hazards to public health from HAP emissions from EGUs that
will remain after imposition of the other provisions of the CAA and
determine whether there are controls available to reduce HAP
emissions from EGUs (Utility Study).
Section 112(n)(1)(B)
required the EPA to study mercury emissions from EGUs and all
other sources of mercury, and to determine the rate and mass of
the mercury emissions, the health and environmental effects of
such emissions, and the availability and cost of controls to reduce
such emissions (Mercury Study). Section 112(n)(1)(C) required the
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) to
conduct a third study related to the threshold level of mercury in
fish tissue that can be consumed without adverse effects to public
health (NIEHS Study).23
The EPA issued its finding in light of the results of these
three studies in 2000, concluding that it was “appropriate and
necessary” to regulate mercury emissions from EGUs. “[B]ased on
particular facts and circumstances, including its determination
that EGUs ‘are the largest domestic source of mercury emissions,
and mercury in the environment presents significant hazards to
public health and the environment.’”24
The EPA changed course in 2005, and reversed their initial
finding. “At that time, EPA interpreted § 7412(n)(1)(A)’s phrase
‘after imposition of the requirements’ of the Act to include both
requirements already in effect and those that EPA ‘reasonably
anticipates will be implemented and will result in reductions of
environmental effects of such emissions, technologies which are available to control
such emissions, and the costs of such technologies.”).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2012).
22. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c). The EGUs of importance to this
analysis are the coal- and oil-fired EGUs.
23. Legal Memorandum Accompanying the Proposed Supplemental Finding
that it is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units (EGUs) (Nov. 20,
2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/documents/20151120legal
memo.pdf.
24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 5 (citing Regulatory
Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,830) (Dec. 20, 2000)).
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utility HAP emissions.’”25
The EPA found the regulation
redundant in light of other statutory safeguards under the CAA,
and brought into focus the high cost of compliance and the
underlying inefficiency of regulating EGUs at such a high cost
with a seemingly low demonstrated benefit.26
The EPA
subsequently removed EGUs from regulation under CAA § 112(c).
Instead, the EPA issued the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR),
which served as a form of “cap-and trade” regulation.27
In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that
the attempt to remove the EGUs from the § 7412(c) list was
unlawful after individual States challenged the EPA’s 2005
decision to delist EGU regulation.28 More specifically, the court
held that “Congress required EPA to make specific determinations
about the health effects of HAP emissions from EGUs before
deleting them from the list, and EPA had not satisfied those
requirements.”29 This ruling vacated the CAMR.30
In 2012, the EPA determined it was not authorized to
consider costs in deciding whether regulation was appropriate
under § 112 of the CAA, and deemed regulation of EGUs to be
appropriate if any single HAP emitted from EGUs is hazardous to
public health or the environment, effectively reaffirming its 2000
finding.31 This decision led to the challenges brought by individual
25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 6 (citing Revision of
December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants
From Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal- and OilFired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units From the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed.
Reg. 15,994, 15,999) (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63)).
26. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing the
reason for the overruling of the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR)).
27. Neb. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, EPA Vacates Clean Air Mercury Rule, AIR
WAVES (July 2008), http://www.deq.state.ne.us/AirWaves.nsf/cf7e4bdd49c643bf
8625747f005a1515/9de6c40a1a1c49688625747f005bc786; see also New Jersey, 517
F.3d at 577. “Cap-and-Trade” is a market-based regulation, which allows polluters
to buy and sell pollution credits after the market is set at a certain limit. See
Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate
Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008). While “cap-and-trade” is still a form
of regulation, it is a market-based regulation that the Court vacated because the
EPA, by implementing the market-based incentives, took mercury out from under
regulation of CAA § 112, Hazardous Air Pollutants, which require Maximum
Achievable Control Technology (MACT), and regulation in order to protect human
health. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 579–80.
28. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582–83.
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 7 (citing New Jersey v.
EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581–82) (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
30. See New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 578 (vacating the Clean Air Mercury Rule).
31. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance
for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and
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states and utilities in White Stallion Energy v. EPA32 and
Michigan v. EPA.33
b. The March of White Stallion—Individual States and
Utilities Brought Suit Claiming that Costs of
Compliance Must be Considered When Promulgating
Regulatory Schemes
In White Stallion Energy, state, industry, and labor parties
challenged the EPA’s decision reaffirming the outcome of the 2000
case.34 Twenty-two states challenged the regulations along with
industry and labor petitioners,35 while sixteen states and the
District of Columbia, along with environmental and public health
intervenors, supported the regulations.36 The petitioners listed a
number of oppositions to the relisting of the 2000 finding; a
number of which the court did not rule on.37 The most pertinent
objection is the second one listed, regarding the petitioners’
objection to the EPA’s interpretation of “appropriate and
necessary,” and it not including the costs of compliance due to
regulation, i.e. objection ultimately ruled on and reversed by the
Supreme Court.38 Specifically, the petitioners refer to the 2005
decision, which allowed considerations of cost to be included into
the greater regulatory analysis of “appropriate;”39 they objected to
the new decision not to include costs in a strict manner40 (as
opposed to them being brought into the greater consideration
through best available implemented technology).41 Petitioners
contend that not including costs “unreasonably constrains the
language of § 112(n)(1)(A),”42 citing a dictionary definition of
“appropriate” and the differences inherent in the regulation of
EGUs under § 112(n)(1)(A), and other sources under § 112(c).43
Most pertinently, the petitioners pointed to precedent, citing “only

Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg.
9304, 9310–11 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 and 63).
32. 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
33. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
34. White Stallion Energy, 748 F.3d at 1229.
35. Id. at 1226–29.
36. Id. at 1230–32.
37. See id. at 1234.
38. Id. at 1236–41.
39. Id. at 1236.
40. Id.
41. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
42. White Stallion Energy, 748 F.3d at 1236 (internal citation omitted).
43. Id.
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where there is ‘clear congressional intent to preclude consideration
of cost’ [do] we find agencies barred from considering costs.”44 The
court ultimately ruled that the EPA was correct in their
interpretation of “appropriate and necessary” and did not need to
consider cost in their analysis for EGU emission regulation,
claiming that “[o]n its face, § 112(n)(1)(A) neither requires EPA to
consider costs nor prohibits EPA from doing so.”45
Judge Kavanaugh dissented as to Part I of the opinion,
foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision on the
matter.46
Judge Kavanaugh begins his analysis with the
Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standard for
EGUs under § 112(d),47 and allows his analysis to evolve into a
discussion over “appropriate”; claiming that regulation of EGUs
has already been deemed “necessary” in response to the studies
required under § 112(n)(1).48 Judge Kavanaugh claims that the
MACT program requires the consideration of costs, even for EGUs,
and thus it was wrong for the EPA to find otherwise.49
II. Effects of Methylmercury (MeHg)
a. Background on the Emissions of Mercury
Mercury is a naturally occurring element found in the
environment, most commonly in rock-like substances.50 According
44. Id. (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001)).
45. Id. at 1237.
46. Id. at 1258 (Kavanuagh, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1259–60 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). In explaining the MACT
standards and the listing process, Judge Kavanaugh stated:
EPA uses a two-step process for setting MACT standards. It begins by
setting a minimum stringency level, or “floor,” based on the performance of
the best-performing units in a particular source category. At that first
step, EPA may not consider costs. Once the agency sets the statutory
floor, it then determines, considering cost and other factors listed in
Section 112(d)(2), whether an even more restrictive standard is
“achievable.” . . . [T]he MACT program[] applies automatically to most
sources of hazardous air pollutants. But for . . . [EGUs], Congress devised
an alternative system as set forth in Section 112(n)(1)(A) of the [CAA].
The alternative system erects two threshold hurdles before EPA may
regulate [EGUs] under the MACT program. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1259 (J. Kavanuagh, dissenting). These steps are the studies mandated
under § 112(n). As previsouly discussed, the next step is the “appropriate and
necessary” determination by the administrator.
48. Id. at 1260 (J. Kavanaugh, dissenting).
49. Id. at 1261 (J. Kavanugh, dissenting) (“It is entirely unreasonable for EPA
to exclude consideration of costs in determining whether it is ‘appropriate’ to
regulate electric utilities under the MACT program.”).
50. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY,
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to the EPA, methylmercury is an elemental mercury that
methylizes; it is “a[n] organic mercury compound[] . . . [and is]
formed when mercury combines with carbon[] . . . [and] is the most
common organic mercury compound found in the environment.”51
Nearly all of the mercury found in fish and their tissues is
methylmercury.52 It is found naturally in coal deposits and
emitted into the air when coal is burned in EGUs.53 Utilities
operate at temperatures above 2000 degrees Fahrenheit, and thus
the mercury present in the “coal and oil is vaporized and
exhausted as a gas[,]” resulting in the emissions.54 One of the
reasons that methylmercury is of such high concern to the EPA
and experts is because of its ability and tendency to travel and
settle in soil composites and water, resulting in bioaccumulation in
natural beings, primarily fish and other aquatic animals.55
Bioaccumulation occurs when fish consume smaller organisms in
which mercury has carbonated, and the toxicity works its way
through the food chain, resulting in consumption of the larger (and
thus more highly concentrated) fish by humans.56
Human
consumption of fish and other seafood is the largest reason for the
accumulation of methylmercury in humans, and the resulting
harms that come from it.57

http://www.epa.gov/mercury/basic-information-about-mercury (last visited Mar. 30,
2017) [hereinafter BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY].
51. Id.
52. U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY,
MERCURY
IN
THE
ENVIRONMENT,
https://www2.usgs.gov/themes/factsheet/146-00/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
53. BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY, supra note 51.
54. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS &
OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS, VOL. II: AN
INVENTORY OF ANTHROPOGENIC MERCURY EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 4–6
(December 1997), http://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics/112nmerc/volume2.pdf [hereinafter
INVENTORY OF ANTHROPOGENIC MERCURY EMISSIONS].
55. Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury, COMM. ON THE TOXICOLOGICAL
EFFECTS OF METHYLMERCURY, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL 16 (2000), http://www.nap.edu/
read/9899/chapter/1. [hereinafter Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury].
56. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,827, 79,827–829 (Dec. 20,
2000).
57. See Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury, supra note 56, at 16 (stating
that human exposure to methylmercury “from contaminated fish and seafood can
pose a variety of health risks.”).
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b. Effects of Methylmercury on the Human Body—Through
the Developing Brain and Beyond
As stated above, one of the primary problems that stems from
mercury emissions is the negative effect on the human body,
which primarily comes through the consumption of fish.58
Studies indicate that there is no positive role mercury plays
in the human body and that even very low doses have adverse
impacts on people.59
Damage from mercury ingestion and
exposure has resulted in harm to the cardiovascular, immune, and
reproductive systems,60 and severely inhibits the performance of
the liver, kidneys, and—of most pertinence importance to this
analysis—the nervous system.61 These impacts result in tremors,
impaired vision and hearing, paralysis, insomnia, and emotional
instability.62
Throughout its mercury studies and as justification for their
efforts to regulate mercury emissions, the EPA has focused on the
impacts that methylmercury has on the developing brain, and
ultimately the impacts of lower IQ points that will be explained
below.63 If the mercury is ingested by the mother while she is
pregnant, it remains in her body for approximately forty-four to
eighty days64 and hinders the healthy development of the fetus’s
brain.65 The mercury moves through the body as it is absorbed by
the gastrointestinal tract and enters the bloodstream, and
ultimately may enter the fetal brain.66 In a pregnant woman, it
58. BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY, supra note 51.
59. Génon Jensen & Karolina Ruzickova, Halting the Child Brain Drain: Why
We Need to Tackle Global Mercury Contamination 18 (2006), http://www.envhealth.org/IMG/pdf/2-_Halting_the_child_brain_drain_Why_we_need_to_tackle_
global_mercury_contamination.pdf.
60. Toxicological Effects of Methylmercury, supra note 56, at 147–250
(discussing the human health effects of the consumption of methylmercury as
derived from various study designs).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS
STANDARDS (2011), http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf
[hereinafter FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS].
64. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING POPULATIONS AT
RISK FROM MERCURY EXPOSURE 27 (2008), http://www.who.int/foodsafety/
publications/chem/mercuryexposure.pdf (noting that the half-life of mercury is
approximately forty-four to eighty days).
65. Id. at 29 (“Because methylmercury-cysteine conjugate readily passes both
the placental barrier and the blood-brain barrier and the developing fetus is
especially sensitive to the toxic effects of methylmercury, exposures during
pregnancy are of highest concern.”).
66. Id. at 27.
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can eventually find its way into cord blood and placental tissue,
resulting in even higher mercury concentrations; some studies
indicate mercury levels in the fetus up to twice as high as
maternal blood mercury levels.67 This is particularly concerning
because methylmercury cannot break down into less harmful
subcomponents. Many of the disorders caused by methylmercury
come to light after the babies are born, as they grow and develop
into young children.68 High methylmercury levels can result in
Attention Deficit Disorder and in particularly low scores on tests
of fine-motor skills, neurobehavioral tests, attention, language,
verbal memory, and visual-spatial abilities.69
Perhaps the most concerning effect, as evidenced by the
EPA’s assessment,70 is the measured drop in IQ in children. This
is perhaps evidenced by the symptoms listed above, though it does
fall somewhat into its own category. IQ drops have historically
been measured in loss of potential income, which has been subject
to criticism,71 as it excludes and effectively devalues nonworking
populations such as the elderly and retired,72 and excludes a host
of other potential monetary costs (resulting in monetized benefits
of regulation), and other social and cultural concerns. These are
discussed in the next section.

67. Sharon D. Wallace, Using Information Technology to Reduce a Health Risk:
Effect of a Mercury Calculator on Consumer Fish Choices and Test of a Model for
Technology Acceptance by Fish Consumers 16–17 (Sept. 7, 2012) (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Trident University International). Related studies have indicated a
“statistically significant relationship existed between frequency of fish meals and
level of MeHg in cord blood.” Id. at 17.
68. See Jensen & Ruzickova, supra note 60, at 12 (indicating that “[c]hildren
and fetuses appear to be more affected than the population as a whole[]” from the
consumption of mercury in fish).
69. Id. at 18.
70. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2716 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the “EPA found that children of mothers exposed to high doses of
mercury during pregnancy ‘have exhibited a variety of developmental neurological
abnormalities,’ including delayed walking and talking, altered muscles, and
cerebral palsy.”).
71. See Catherine A. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context: A
Madness to EPA’s Method, 38 ENVTL. L. 495, 514 (2008) [hereinafter O’Neill,
Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context].
72. Id. at 528 (stating that CBA studies using a loss-in-earnings approach
imply that “the lives of retired people are worth nothing—or perhaps less than
nothing, since they consume scarce goods and services without earning or
producing any marketed goods themselves.”).
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III. Cultural Significance—Apportionment of Fishing
Rights to Tribes and Related Effects
a. The Majority of Elevated Mercury Levels are Found in
Communities that Consume Large Amounts of Fish,
Like Native American Communities, Many of Which
Place Cultural Significance in Fishing or Live
Subsistence Lifestyles
Professor Catherine O’Neill captures the stark reality of
mercury consumption in Native American communities nearly
perfectly:
This widespread [mercury] contamination poses a particular
threat to many Native American peoples. Historically and in
contemporary times, members of these fishing peoples
consume more fish, at greater frequency, and in accordance
with different cultural practices than the general population.73

Many surveys conducted historically and into the modern day
do not take into account the cultural and subsistence significance
of activities such as fishing.74
While the Supreme Court has given effective weight and
consideration to CBA,75 as has the EPA (though not entirely to the
Court’s satisfaction),76 environmental justice issues have largely
been ignored to the EPA’s detriment.77
The EPA had an
73. Catherine A. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest: The Right to Catch and
Consume Fish, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 131, 132 (2007) [hereinafter O’Neill,
Protecting the Tribal Harvest].
74. Id. at 134.
75. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015).
76. Clean Air Act—Cost Benefit Analysis—Michigan v. EPA, 129 HARV. L. REV.
311, 312–13 (2015). The Regulatory Impact Analysis, which included a calculation
of costs and benefits, was issued alongside the final rule in order to comply with
Executive Order 12,866. Id. at 312. The Executive Order required that agencies
conduct CBA for “significant regulatory actions.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30,1993). “Significant regulatory actions” are defined (in
pertinent part) as:
“Hav[ing] an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities[.]”
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993).
77. Executive Order No. 12,898 was issued by President Bill Clinton. It
requires,
To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, and consistent
with the principles set forth in the report on the National Performance
Review, each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice
part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and
low-income populations in the United States and its territories and
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opportunity to include the impacts on Native American
communities, some of which were brought directly before them in
earnest opposition to the overruled CAMR. During the notice and
comment period for the final CAMR, the National Congress of
American Indians and Treaty Tribes issued comments discussing
the harmful effects of un- and under-regulated mercury emissions,
and the resulting havoc wrought on their communities.78
The most problematic part about this is that the EPA issued
a RIA quantifying the costs of industry compliance, discussing the
dangers of mercury pollution in general terms, and specifically
quantifying only the harms to recreational anglers who consumed
their catch as the purported benefits.79 This is the same route
taken by the EPA seven years later, still armed with the same
information from tribal members, and still largely ignoring the
impacts and harms their communities face by solely incorporating
the harms of methylmercury consumption by recreational anglers
and their children calculated through IQ loss.80 In fact, the EPA
conceded that Native American populations would remain
vulnerable when CAMR was proposed.81 Specifically, forty-five
percent of the entire Native American population subject to the
reach of the government of the United States (and thus the
impacts of its regulations) would be exposed to “unsafe levels of
utility-attributable mercury . . . .”82
The effects on individual tribes and communities have come
to light through studies conducted by legal scholars, and by the
outcry of many tribal and community members themselves. In
particular, tribes from coastal areas, specifically the Pacific
Northwest, Great Lakes region, and the Northeastern United
States have expressed concern over the bioaccumulation in the
fish and the problems that persist because of its infiltration. In
the Pacific Northwest, the Columbia River Basin is a vital
resource for tribal fishing; one study (based on figures gathered by
possessions, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands.
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
78. The EPA was aware of the impacts in Native American Populations, which
arose under the notice and comment period for CAMR, which was effectively
invalidated under the decision New Jersey v. EPA. See O’Neill, Environmental
Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 516, 534.
79. See FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64.
80. See id. at 7–25.
81. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest, supra note 74, at 136 (citing
Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 69 Fed. Reg.
4652, 4709) (Jan. 30, 2004) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 60, 63).
82. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 517.
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the EPA)83 captured the increased risk of contamination in Native
American peoples versus the general population:
Whereas someone consuming at the general population
average rate (here, 7.5 grams [of fish]/day) is currently
exposed to excess cancer risks ranging from 1 in 100,000 to 1
in 10,000, a tribal member consuming subsistence rates as
documented by Harris and Harper (540 grams/day) is
currently exposed to cancer risks up to nearly 1 in 100. The
disparity is stark, with tribal members facing risks perhaps
100 times that of the general population.84

Another study conducted by the California Department of
Natural Resources takes note of the detrimental effect that the
loss of traditional food sources has on tribal members. Focusing
on the Karuk Tribe, a subsistence fishing tribe, the study
demonstrated that the lack of availability of fish, due in part to
contamination, has led to a “host of diet related illnesses among
Native Americans . . . ”85
In other circumstances, the EPA gave figures that were
misleading and not representative of true consumption levels of
subsistence fishing populations. In the CAMR RIA, the EPA
assumes an average fish consumption rate of twenty grams a
day,86 a figure far below that of the Harris and Harper study noted
above. Though the figures come from studies conducted on
different tribes, the EPA considered this an accurate figure for a
subsistence fishing population.87
Contamination and increasingly limited access to a vital
resource impacts a tribe’s ability to practice their traditional
subsistence lifestyle, and presents further harms that fall into
quantifiable categories. Increased medical costs for a population
that undoubtedly suffers a higher risk of IQ loss, behavioral
disorders, and the host of other disorders, diseases, and symptoms
highly associated with increased mercury levels is just one area of
would-be quantifiable risk assessment. This can result in loss of
future opportunities in the form of skilled jobs and ultimate
83. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest, supra note 74, at 137.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. KARI MARIE NORGAARD, THE EFFECTS OF ALTERED DIET ON THE HEALTH OF
THE KARUK 9 (2005). These diet-related illnesses include “diabetes, obesity, heart
disease, tuberculosis, hypertension, kidney troubles, and strokes.” Id. See also
Health Disparities Experienced by American Indians and Alaska Natives,
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (Aug. 1, 2003), https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/pdf/wk/mm5230.pdf (indicating that Native Americans and Alaskan Natives
are two to three times as likely as all other ethnic populations combined to face
these types of illnesses and symptoms).
86. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 524.
87. Id. at 524–25.
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earning potential, setting affected children behind their peers and
keeping them there. Other impacts could be quantified in loss of
potential fish sales as well. There are some aspects of this
injustice that are not quantifiable per se, but instead embody
substantive legal rights that should extend far beyond the reach of
CBA. These are discussed below.
b. Native American Communities Have Legal Rights to
Apportioned Fisheries That Have Been Largely Ignored
in Modern Environmental Regulation
Many Native American communities, especially across the
Northeastern, Great Lakes, and Pacific Northwest regions of the
United States have apportioned fishing rights that have been
secured through treaty agreements and rights.88
Perhaps the most glaring and relevant omission in the EPA’s
final RIA for the mercury ruling challenged in Michigan v. EPA is
the exclusion of Native American peoples in their final calculation
for the benefits of regulating mercury.89 In a dominant society, as
the EPA clearly established, activities such as fishing and
consuming catch are considered primarily recreational and
economic in nature.90 While this is true on a large scale, this
school of thought blatantly erases communities that subsist on
fish, not only by consumption, but also through their ability to sell
their catch.91
Professor Catherine O’Neill makes an interesting point
regarding this large area of United States law that remains
relatively ignored, especially in regards to environmental justice.
O’Neill notes that many Native American tribes were granted
treaty rights, which often included access to vast swaths of land
and, in the case of fishing tribes, access and apportionment rights
to catch fish and consume as needed.92 Though not all tribes
gained their rights through treaties,93 many tribes did. Two very
pertinent examples include tribes in the Pacific Northwest region
and the Great Lakes region, in particular the Lake Superior
88. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 499.
89. See FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64.
90. See id.
91. See O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at
506 (stating that treaties protecteing fishing rights have been recognized to include
both “tribal members’ right to fish in the ceded area, but also their right to
consume the fish they catch or to sell it other others for others’ consumption”).
92. Id. at 505–06 n.47.
93. Id. (noting that some tribes gained right through “executive orders and
other federal laws”).
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Chippewa.94 These treaties granted rights to the Chippewa to
catch, consume, and sell or trade fish.95
Professor O’Neill
importantly notes that treaties are considered laws that deserve
the highest deference; they reside in the hierarchy of laws just
below the Constitution, are considered “the supreme law of the
land”, and ultimately fall beyond the scope of CBA.96
Unfortunately, consideration of these treaties and their
importance failed to make the cut in the EPA’s final promulgated
regulation.
One of best opportunities that the EPA had when quantifying
the benefits of increased regulation of mercury emissions was to
consider the inability to replace fish, the industries, and lifestyles
that they comprise and complement.
Although the fishing
industry could likely be quantified, the cultural significance of a
bygone resource upon which a population has been dependent for
centuries is harder to quantify. The fact of the matter is, fishing
for subsistence populations is an activity that cannot be replaced.
Fishing is an activity of identity, and it serves as a very important
tradition to the people who practice it.97 There are some things
that simply have no replacement; once they are gone or impaired,
they cannot be fixed or returned.98 Put bluntly, subsistence
fishing tribes cannot go fishing for tofu cubes in Lake Superior or
Puget Sound. A right with such high cultural importance has no
substitute.
Professor O’Neill coins an interesting phrase and
accompanying concept, which is specifically applicable in a
situation such as this. She notes that agencies punt the issue;
they practice “risk avoidance” as opposed to either “risk
reduction,” or attacking the impacts of a particular problem from
the source.99 For example, the EPA issues fish consumption
advisories, warning people about the dangers of high fish
consumption and essentially telling the population to consume less

94. Id. at 506.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 531 (1832)).
97. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 509.
98. O’Neill, Protecting the Tribal Harvest Fish, supra note 74, at 139.
99. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 512;
see also Catherine A. O’Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimination, and
Environmental Justice for Native Peoples, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2003) (describing the
detrimental impacts of risk avoidance in Native American communities); Catherine
A. O’Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and
“Acceptable” Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3 (2000); Catherine A.
O’Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11070 (2004).
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fish, especially larger, predatory fish.100 As Professor O’Neill
notes, such risk avoidance fails to integrate other ecological and
environmental effects, such as the bioaccumulation of the food
chain in other mammals, the presence in the water and soil, and
the fish themselves.101 Risk avoidance fails to incorporate the
other harmful impacts of pollution and results in further
detriment not only to Native American populations, but society at
large.
Furthermore, there are some federalism issues at play
regarding the regulatory structure of hazardous pollutants and
where they should be regulated.102 In recent years, the EPA has
struck down beneficial use regulations regulated under the Clean
Water Act.103 The Clean Water Act gives much more deference to
individual states than does the Clean Air Act, which controls air
quality regulation, primarily from a federal standpoint.104 While
the Clean Water Act is largely outside of the scope of this analysis,
it warrants inclusion here as there is pending litigation over
where beneficial uses, primarily regarding subsistence fishing and
the rights of Native American peoples.105 Instead of bolstering
CBA under the Clean Air Act regulations, as was the issue in
Michigan v. EPA, the EPA is forcing the individual states to
essentially rewrite their water quality standards in order to
combat the effects of mercury poisoning and the effects on fishconsuming populations.106 Not only does this frustrate the already
complex federalism structure, but it is only a reactionary measure
as much of the mercury found in water and fish comes from air

100. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 512.
101. Id. (stating that risk avoidance fails to measure “the harms that
contamination visits on non-human species, such as loons and mink, who obviously
cannot read fish consumption advisories.”).
102. The federalism issues discussed in this section are strictly vertical; they
apply to the cooperative federalism structure that comprises the Clean Air Act and
the Clean Water Act. Although important to mention in this note, a more in-depth
analysis is beyond the scope of the argument presented in this Article.
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(b) (2012).
104. Id. Under the Clean Air Act, states submit State Implementation Plans
that must be approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (2012). In contrast, the
Clean Water Act grants deference to states on how to monitor and allocate water
resources subject to overarching federal oversight.
105. See Sean McLernon, Maine Sues EPA Over Control of State’s Tribal Waters,
LAW 360, (July 7, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/555064/maine-sues-epaover-control-of-state-s-tribal-waters (indicating that Maine has brought a lawsuit
against the EPA seeking a “declaration that its environmental jurisdiction applies
uniformly throughout the state, including waters within Indian territories.”).
106. Id.
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pollution.107 Moreover, it places the states into a hard position by
forcing them to regulate something that they cannot necessarily
control,108 and punts the issue by not regulating the issue at the
source.109
IV. Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis Including the Impacts
on Cultural Fish Consumption
The primary idea behind Bayesian110 Cost-Benefit Analysis is
the incorporation of previously “unquantified” benefits into the
overall equation of CBA.111 This requires the agency experts to
“make reasonable guesses about the harms or benefits from
regulations” despite occasions “where they lack complete
data . . . .”112 According to Professors Jonathan Masur and Eric
Posner, these preliminary guesses constitute Bayesian prior
probabilities. “While agencies should be permitted to ‘guess’—that
is, supply a subjective prior probability—they must also be
required to update their estimates as they gain new
information.”113
This is especially appropriate given the
administrative law principles surrounding Chevron deference;114
the court system defers to agencies as they make these kinds of
decisions.
The primary problem with the EPA’s analysis is that they did
not update their primary monetized benefits with which they
marched through the courtroom door. The recreational angler and
107. John Myers, Study: Most Mercury in Lake Superior Comes from
Atmosphere, DULUTH NEWS TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.duluthnews
tribune.com/news/3924020-study-most-mercury-lake-superior-comes-atmosphere.
108. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: CROSS-STATE AIR POLLUTION RULE
(CSAPR), https://www.epa.gov/csapr (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
109. See BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT MERCURY, supra note 51.
110. Eric W. Weisstein, Bayesian Analysis, MATH WORLD—A WOLFRAM WEB
RESOURCE, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BayesianAnalysis.html (last visited Feb.
26, 2017) (“Bayesian analysis is a statistical procedure which endeavors to estimate
parameters of an underlying distribution based on the observed distribution.”).
111. Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 100–13.
112. Id. at 92.
113. Id. Professors Masur and Posner went on to list clarifying recommendations
for agencies engaging in Bayesian CBA:
In particular, agencies should be required (1) to provide a mechanism for
empirically evaluating their estimates after the regulation is issued; (2) to
revisit and update their earlier estimates in light of what subsequent
studies reveal; and (3) to use consistent estimates across agencies. We
describe our proposal as loosely “Bayesian” because of the emphasis on the
importance of updating priors as an institutional solution to the problem of
regulatory uncertainty.
Id. at 92–93.
114. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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fish consumption category had been put through the fire, so to
speak, as it was the basis for the pervious mercury standards that
were overruled.115
The most heavily impacted communities
presented the EPA with concerns about mercury contamination,
yet these communities were effectively left out of the solution
equation.116 While some studies have shown that recreational
fishing can pose an increased risk because of elevated levels of
methylmercury,117 this remains only one area of quantified risk, as
shown by the EPA,118 in a country where many of the citizens
consume fish.
Some commentators believe that while CBA is a popular tool
that has been utilized in legislation and rulemaking, the
constraints of its rigid application need to be recognized, in
addition to what exactly CBA does, and is intended to do.119
Simply put, CBA is a decision procedure that can be used as a less
expensive alternative to other tools.120 With this critique comes
the urging, that because CBA is a decision procedure, and not a
moral one, CBA needs to be kept in context as it is utilized.121
CBA also needs to be accommodating to alternative means in
which to measure unquantified benefits and non-monetized
values, like the benefits of protecting resources of high cultural
significance, among others.122
There are conflicting views on how best to monetize
unquantified benefits, or how to value them in a non-monetary
manner. While Bayesian analysis relies on experts’ relevant
experiences and estimates, it is still difficult to assign a price
value to something that does not have a monetized value. Natural
resources often fall into this category. A rather simple example
would include forest preservation and the associated health
benefits with cleaner air. While it is possible to monetize, at least
to some extent, the improved health benefits associated with clean
air, it is much harder to assign a monetary value to something like
115. Standards for Performance for New and Existing Sources: Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75).
116. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 534–
36.
117. Wallace, supra note 68, at 13.
118. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015).
119. Adler & Posner, supra note 15, at 168.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Supreme Court’s (and federal government at large) move towards
the use of CBA is pertinent to this analysis, an in-depth look at the structure of it
at large is outside the scope.
122. Id.
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the aesthetics of a forest. The clean air can be accounted for with
the preservation of a forest, but individual values on larger
resources vary. Some people place value in simply knowing such a
place exists. The waters of CBA begin to get murky in these areas
of analysis; in relation to this note, it is cultural value associated
with cultural practices that are hard to quantify, and are thus
simply left out of CBA.
One commentator has suggested that the best way to account
for benefits is to split them into categories. He laid them out in
the following chart, specifically pertaining to cultural examples of
costs and benefits:123

123. Dupuis, supra note 15, at 10.
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The categorical separation occurs in four primary arenas
(monetary/real,124
tangible/intangible,125
internal/external,126
127
final/immediate ) as exemplified above, and breaks the costs and
benefits down into a more representative example, as these
categories include the preciously unquantified benefits.128
Admittedly, identification into each of these categories can be
extremely difficult, which is one of the reasons that so many of
them are not included in larger cost-benefit analyses. Professor
Dupuis noted:
The fact is that the implications of projects in practically every
case concern far larger areas and populations than those
under the direct responsibility of the authorities
concerned . . . [Additionally], [t]he various implications of a
project may vary in the time they take to appear or
disappear.129

These categories bolster the framework of Bayesian CBA, by
allowing the previously unquantified benefits to be exemplified
and presented, instead of simply allowing agencies to exclude
benefits that could not be monetized from CBA. Unfortunately,
this was the route taken by the EPA in the case at issue in
Michigan v. EPA, and has been a route taken by the EPA for many
years.130
124. Id. Further:
Real costs and benefits, for their part, are not expressed in money terms.
They are real in the sense that it is they that affect the general level of
satisfaction of society. Since they relate to the development of individual
and social values their nature is complex. Sometimes impossible to
quantify they are, in most cases, difficult at the very least even to identify
clearly.
Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 7–8 (“Tangible costs and benefits refer to those to which a market
value can be assigned, either directly or indirectly, by the various methods we have
described. Intangible costs and benefits are those for which a market valuation
proves impossible or is completely meaningless.”).
126. Id. at 8. Dupuis describes internal and external costs and benefits as vital
to analyses that include qualitative components, such as cultural value and
significance. Id. Specifically, “an externality is considered to exist where there is
interdependence but no compensation . . . . Internal costs and benefits are those
directly related to the implementation of the project whereas external costs and
benefits are all those inferred by the project.” Id.
127. Id. at 9 (“A cost or benefit is ‘final’ if it is borne by or directly benefits the
end consumer. An intermediate cost or benefit arises at the level of the production
of other goods or services and will therefore affect the welfare of consumers
(measured in terms of surplus) only in an indirect manner.”).
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id. at 8. While calculation of unquantified benefits is important, actual
calculation of the unquantified benefits at issue here are beyond the scope of this
analysis.
130. Adler & Posner, supra note 15, at 175–76.
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a. The EPA Only Quantified the Costs to Recreational
Anglers Who Consume Their Catch; Other NonMonetized Benefits Should Be Assumed and Accounted
For, and as a Result, the Direct Benefits Would Greatly
Increase
According to the Supreme Court in Michigan v. EPA, some
form of CBA must be conducted; however, as Justice Scalia noted
in the opinion, it need not be completely formalized.131 In
Michigan, the EPA described their quantified benefits as follows:
The monetized benefits from reductions in mercury emissions,
calculated only for children exposed to recreationally caught
freshwater fish, are expected to be $0.004 to $0.006 billion in
2016 using a 3% discount rate and $0.0005 to $0.001 billion
using a 7% discount rate. The annual social costs,
approximated by the compliance costs, are $9.6 billion (2007$)
and the annual monetized net benefits are $27 to $80 billion
using 3% discount rate or $24 to $71 billion using a 7%
discount rate.132

This process, while used by most agencies in regulatory CBA,
presents a limited perception of the direct benefits derived from
mercury regulation, with the glaring omissions of benefits to other
human activity and well-being. In fact, the EPA acknowledges
this:
EPA was unable to quantify or monetize all of the health and
environmental benefits associated with the final MATS Rule.
EPA believes these unquantified benefits could be substantial,
including the overall value associated with HAP reductions,
value of increased agricultural crop and commercial forest
yields, visibility improvements, and reductions in nitrogen and
acid deposition and the resulting changes in ecosystem
functions.133

Professors Masur and Posner very candidly note that benefits
are often much harder to identify and quantify than the costs of
something like industry compliance, and they hint at the internal
biases of CBA when it is applied in a very strict form (as it often is
in regulatory measures).134 Unfortunately, this often results in
leaving very important benefits by the wayside, which gives only a
fractured picture of what should be an otherwise holistic analysis.

131. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015) (“We need not and do not
hold that the law unambiguously required the Agency, when making this
preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each
advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value.”).
132. FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64, at ES-1.
133. Id. at ES-9.
134. Masur & Posner, supra note 15, at 184.
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What about the host of other problems that stem from
methylmercury ingestion? While a loss in IQ points is certainly a
large concern, and in some circumstances may even encompass
other problems associated with a drop in IQ, the EPA did not
calculate these other impacts. As mentioned earlier, the EPA only
calculated the impacts anticipated from a drop in potential
income.135 Thus, the EPA’s analysis left out the benefits in
curbing the effects on other organs and decreasing behavioral
disorders, impaired motor skills, and other identified impacts.136
Professor O’Neill discusses a few problems with this analysis,
especially when examining the traditions and livelihoods that are
incorporated in many Native American communities. These
values do not capture the importance of other roles filled in the
community. For instance, things like lost productivity are not
measured, which is something that other agencies have
measured.137 While there may be an argument that this figure is
rolled into the loss of potential income, the addition of this
calculation would no doubt bolster the EPA’s analysis. These two
calculations provide just two examples of other areas in which the
EPA could have expanded their calculations to close in on the CBA
balance threshold, and in a major way. By including a population
that requires vital attention due to cultural significance with a
threatened resource and increased threats to this resource, their
values could have (and still can) climb higher than a similar
comparison with a subset of dominant society.
The EPA quantified the loss in individual IQ points in both
the CAMR RIA and the Final RIA, and used the same criteria for
each. The 2005 CAMR RIA quantified each lost IQ point at $8,807
(adjusted for inflation for the year 2015, the value reaches
$10,688.22 per IQ point).138 This is the bare minimum; it is only
one subsection of the greater population of the United States, and
only one quantified benefit calculated for one negative impact of
methylmercury (otherwise a benefit for regulation). In addition,
the EPA stated that, though the Native American communities
would be adversely affected by the methylmercury accumulation
in a primary food source, the impacts would not be very large

135. FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 64, at 4-2.
136. See Jensen & Ruzickova, supra note 60, at 18 (describing the effects of
methylmercury poisoning on children around the world).
137. See Masur & Posner, supra note 15 (discussing the different routes
government agencies having taken when quantifying costs and benefits in the
past).
138. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context, supra note 72, at 514.
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because of their location; most Native American communities were
not located next to large EGUs.139 It is important to note that to
claim this is to ignore the global impacts of emissions, which have
become an increasing problem since the rise of the industrial age.
b. Issues to Consider Going Forward: The Participation of
the United States in International Emissions
Standards.
Not all of the emissions come directly from utilities and
industrial sites in the United States. In fact, some recent studies
show that some mercury emissions in the Upper Great Lakes140
could be coming from as far away as China.141 Emissions do not
obey political or jurisdictional boundaries just because a
smokestack points skyward and it does not mean the contents it
carries remain suspended there.
One study applied the lens of the widespread effects of
mercury pollution; the results indicated decreased IQ levels in
children, with costs ranging anywhere from $2.2–$43.8 billion in
lost productivity annually ($2.64 billion–$52.5 billion when
adjusted for inflation in the year 2014). While these numbers
clearly exceed populations of Native American children alone,
these figures provide one example of some of the available
information that could have been analyzed alongside the
information the EPA ended up using. Put into a larger context,
this one measurement begins to give a shape to the vast, negative
impacts that require a global solution. While jurisdictional
constraints require the EPA to regulate within the borders of the
United States, the global impacts of mercury emissions (among
others) should begin to prompt global discussions in the future.142
Conclusion
Seeing as the Supreme Court has unanimously moved in the
direction of mandating CBA for major regulations, the EPA (and
other agencies) need to expand the scope of their CBA, including
those benefits not previously considered “quantifiable” through
Bayesian CBA. So far, the EPA has largely ignored this new
139. Id. at 523.
140. Upper Great Lakes have historically been used to refer to Lakes Superior,
Huron, and parts of Lake Michigan. See Myers, supra note 108.
141. See id.
142. While the Paris Climate Talks focused primarily on greenhouse gas
emissions, the talks provided an excellent drawing board for approaching emissions
control on a global scale.
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requirement. Specifically, the EPA issued a legal memorandum
claiming that they followed the required regulations by including
the cost of compliance incrementally and inherently through the
MACT standards (despite being overruled).143
The primary
problem with this is that the Court has already ruled that this is
an inadequate way to conduct CBA, thus the EPA is setting
themselves up to be overruled again. The EPA has an excellent
opportunity to include more benefits resulting from heightened
regulations of mercury, and should do so in order to avoid being
overruled in the future.
One of the best opportunities that the EPA has to expand its
analysis with regards to benefits is Native American populations
that rely on subsistence fishing; the impacts that accrue with
populations that consume higher concentrations of fish yield
higher benefits. This one area could greatly bolster the EPA’s
analysis in the future, and may serve as a catalyst for other
federal agencies moving forward. As explained above, this is
primarily done through Bayesian CBA, a school of thought that
works to quantify benefits that are by their very nature (and the
existing structure of law and economics) unquantifiable. These
analyses will help the government and the regulations
promulgated by agencies, particularly in regards to environmental
impacts, to keep vulnerable populations and issues of deep
cultural significance protected. These issues are part of the
equation and should be treated as such.
For better or for worse, regulation increases when negative
impacts of processes, products, and activities in daily life are
discovered. Individuals and communities certainly want to limit,
to the extent possible, the vague and sometimes unforeseen
problems that could arise in the future. This is especially true in
regards to finite and precious resources, and ultimately human life
and its quality. These important things are threatened by
permanent change for which there is no remedy. It is incumbent
upon the United States as a nation to address these problems up
front for what they are, and work to mitigate the negative impacts
as much as possible. This work includes the most vulnerable
among us; despite perceived population size and location,
acceptable risk is ultimately no greater for one person than it is
another. Incorporating their risk and the value of their traditions
is vital as the United States moves forward in the twenty-first
century.
143. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).

